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and describe the characteristics of recipients.  I then discuss empirical work on the effects 
of the EITC on poverty and the income distribution, and its effects on labor supply.  
Next, I discuss a few policy concerns about the EITC: possible negative effects on hours 
of work and marriage, and problems of compliance with the tax system.   I then simulate 
the effects of the recent expansion of the credit for families with three or more children 
that were part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  I also re-
examine the key assumptions of past work on the labor supply effects of the EITC.  
Finally, I briefly discuss the likely effects of further expanding the credit to non-custodial 
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   1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its inception in 1975, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has 
grown dramatically in size and is now the largest anti-poverty program for the non-aged 
in the United States.  In 2007, 25 million families received EITC payments totaling $49.7 
billion.
1  As a result, the EITC lifted at least 4.0 million individuals above the poverty 
line.  In addition to directly raising incomes, the EITC has sharply changed work 
incentives, currently increasing the after-tax wage by up to forty-five percent for those 
with low earnings.  The EITC is part of the tax system and does not require people to 
have a tax liability that the credit offsets.  A person without a net tax liability receives it 
as a payment that, by 2009, could be as large as $5,657.   The fundamental problem in 
designing tax and transfer programs to those with few resources is that such programs 
undermine work effort. The goal of the EITC has been to transfer income while 
encouraging work.  This feature led to the political support for its initial adoption and for 
its subsequent expansions (Liebman 1998, Ventry 2001).  The program has taken on 
increased prominence in recent years as policy makers have sought to reduce the 
dependence encouraged by welfare programs.   
In this paper, I first summarize how the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
operates and describe the characteristics of recipients.  I then discuss empirical work on 
the effects of the EITC on poverty and income distribution, and its effects on labor 
supply.  Next, I discuss a few policy concerns about the EITC: possible negative effects 
on hours of work and marriage, and problems of compliance with the tax system.   I then 
simulate the effects of the recent expansion of the credit for families with three or more 
                                                 
1 Seventeen percent of those filing tax returns received the EITC.   2
children that were part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 
2009.  I also re-examine the key assumptions of past work on the labor supply effects of 
the EITC.  Finally, I briefly discuss the likely effects of further expanding the credit to 
non-custodial parents, as has been recently done in two jurisdictions.     
 
HOW THE EITC WORKS 
 
The EITC provides an earnings subsidy to family members who satisfy three 
criteria.  First, a family must have a wage earner, since only those who work are eligible.  
Second, the family must have low income.  In 2007, a family with one child could 
receive the EITC if its income was below $33,241, while a family with two children 
could earn up to $37,783 and receive a credit.
2  Third, while a small EITC (up to $428 in 
2007) is available to the childless, to receive a significant EITC, a family has to have 
resident children.  The maximum credit for a family with one child was $2,853 in 2007, 
while that for a family with two or more children was $4,716.  Since the EITC is 
refundable, a family can receive the credit even if they do not have an income tax 
liability.  In the vast majority of cases, the credit is received as a lump sum as part of a 
tax refund early the following year.  The tax filer must fill out a one page form with 
information on the qualifying child or children that is submitted with the rest of the tax 
return.  In summary, the credit subsidizes work by poor parents as it transfers income to 
them. 
The EITC schedule for families with children for 2007 is shown in Figure 1.  The 
                                                 
2 Beginning in 2002, a married couple could have income $1,000 higher and still receive a tax credit.  This 
was changed to $2,000 starting with tax year 2005, $3,000 in 2008, and $5,000 in 2009.   3
top schedule, for families with two or more children, provides a larger credit at all 
income levels than that for one-child families, shown underneath.  Both schedules 
provide a large earnings subsidy initially as the credit is phased in: forty cents for each 
dollar earned for the first $11,790 in earnings for those with two or more children.  For 
example, a single mother with two children who earned $10,000 would receive a credit of 
$4,000.  In the flat, or plateau part of the schedule, the total credit received does not 
change with earnings.  With additional earnings beyond the plateau, however, the credit 
is decreased in the phase-out region, resulting in an implicit tax on earnings at a rate just 
over 21 percent for those with two or more children.  For those with one child there are 




As part of the ARRA, the EITC was temporarily expanded for three child families 
and those filing joint returns.  The ARRA created a new higher schedule for those with 
three or more children by increasing the phase-in subsidy rate to 45 percent and raising 
the maximum credit to $5,657 for 2009.  The plateau portion of the schedule was also 
extended for joint filers to be $5,000 more than that for single filers, regardless of the 
number of qualifying dependents.   Previously, it had been $3,000 more.  These changes 
allowed couples with three children to receive the maximum credit with earnings between 
$12,550 and $21,399 and to receive some credit with earnings below $48,279.   
Two jurisdictions, New York State and the District of Columbia, have introduced 
EITCs for noncustodial parents who are paying child support.  These reforms are   4
described in detail below.   
 
WHO RECEIVES THE EITC 
 
While eligibility for the EITC does not explicitly select single mothers, the 
income ranges and the dependence on children leads the credit to implicitly target single 
mothers.  To paint a statistical portrait of recipients, I examine their characteristics from 
several angles and with two data sets.  The two sources of data do not perfectly agree, but 
they lead to roughly similar conclusions.  Table 1 is calculated from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the largest in-depth survey of the economic status of American 
households.  Based on data for 2007, the table suggests that nearly 50 percent of EITC 
dollars go to single mothers.  Adding in single fathers, one can see that over half (57 
percent) of EITC dollars go to single parents, even though they represent just over 10 
percent of  U.S. households.  Since poor families with children are disproportionately 
headed by single parents, such families receive a large share of EITC payments.  The vast 
majority of remaining dollars go to married couples with children, who receive 38 
percent of the credit dollars.  While a substantial number of recipient couples or 
individuals are childless (26 percent), they only receive 5 percent of the credit dollars 
even though they are 77 percent of households.  This concentration of 95 percent of EITC 
dollars in families with children reflects the program design that provides larger credits to 
these families. 
Table 2 reports demographic characteristics of EITC recipients with children, by 
marital status.   The characteristics of non-recipients with children are reported for   5
comparison.  Single recipients with children are fairly similar to single non-recipients 
with children: they have the same number of children on average, but are slightly older, 
less educated (particularly less likely to have a college degree) and have slightly younger 
children.  Married recipients are much less educated and are somewhat younger than 
married non-recipients with children.  Both single and married recipients are more likely 
to be black than non-recipients; nevertheless, the vast majority of EITC recipients are 
white.  Married recipients are older and have more children than single recipients.   
The CPS is the best source of detailed information on the characteristics of 
families receiving the EITC.  However, credit information is not reported by recipients in 
the CPS; it is imputed by the Census Bureau from demographic characteristics.  Data 
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provide better information on numbers of 
recipients and credit amounts.  Table 3 provides a less detailed breakdown of the 
characteristics of EITC recipients and compares CPS and IRS data.  The IRS data 
indicate that an even larger share of EITC dollars go to single parents (those with a head 
of household filing status): 73 percent of all payments in 2003.  This compares to the 49 
percent figure that is obtained from the CPS for the same year.  Almost all of the 
remaining dollars go to married couples as they receive 25 percent of all payments.  
The EITC is also targeted toward large families.  The bottom panel of Table 3 
reports total benefits received and the number of recipient families by number of 
children.  IRS data indicate that families with more than one child receive most of the 
credit dollars, over 61 percent of total payments.  CPS data indicate a slightly higher 
share of payments go to families with two or more children.  Overall, one can see from 
Table 3 that the IRS paid out $44.4 billion dollars under the EITC in 2006.    6
In the last column of Table 3, I report the ratio of dollars or recipients imputed in 
the CPS to the comparable numbers from IRS data.  In the case of heads of household, 
the CPS captures less than half of dollars.  Overall, less than two-thirds of the dollars paid 
out are captured by the CPS.  The discrepancy between the IRS and CPS figures is a 
major unresolved puzzle.  Possible explanations include IRS payments to ineligible 
recipients, CPS sample weights that are possibly too low for EITC recipients, or possibly 
under-reporting of earnings in the CPS.  There seems to be a large and systematic under-
representation of those with low taxable income in the CPS (O’Hara 2004), with IRS 
published data for 2002 indicating that 29.3 percent of taxpayers had Adjusted Gross 
Income (AGI) under $15,000, while CPS data indicate that only 23.1 percent of taxpayers 
did.  It is unclear how much of this difference is due to individuals not reporting income 
or not being sampled by the CPS, or people reporting to the CPS that they earn more 
income than they report to the IRS.      
 
HOW THE EITC AFFECTS THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
 
The effect of the EITC on the income distribution is among the most important 
effects of the tax credit.  A convenient way to gauge the distributional effects of the EITC 
is to ask how many people it raises above the poverty line or its multiples.
3  As shown in 
Table 4, in 2007 the EITC lifted just over 1.1 million families and over 2.1 million 
children above the poverty line.  Overall, relying on these Census Bureau calculations, 
the credit lifted just under 4.0 million people above the poverty line, reducing the overall 
poverty rate by 10 percent, and the poverty rate among children by 16 percent.  Because 
                                                 
3 This approach accounts for differences across family size using the Census Bureau equivalence scale.     7
the Census Bureau imputes many fewer EITC dollars than are paid out as can be seen in 
Table 3, the likely effects of the EITC are much larger, as we discuss below.  If we 
believe investments in children are especially productive (Heckman and Masterov 2007), 
then the EITC is well targeted. 
While no other anti-poverty program reduces the poverty rate as much as the 
EITC, one caution is that the effects of the EITC are concentrated around the poverty line 
(as noted by others such as Liebman 1998).  Table 4 shows that the number of families or 
children below other target levels such as 50 percent of the poverty line or 200 percent of 
the poverty line are also sharply reduced by the EITC.  However, the largest effects occur 
at levels just under the poverty line: the largest percentage changes tend to be at 75 
percent of the poverty line.   
An interesting question is how the EITC compares to other policies that transfer 
income to the poor such as our main cash welfare program for single parents, Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and our main broad-based program (similar to a 
negative income tax) that provides food assistance, the Food Stamp Program.  In Table 5 
I compare the analyses of Table 4 for the EITC to the corresponding ones for TANF and 
food stamps.  As expected, these programs are more targeted at those with the very 
lowest incomes.  Nevertheless, in part because it has shrunk in size since welfare reform, 
TANF has a smaller effect at all income cutoffs than the EITC.  Even at half the poverty 
line, it only raises 4 percent of people over the line compared to 9 percent for the EITC.  
TANF has little effect at the poverty line, raising 1 percent of people out of poverty 
compared to 10 percent for the EITC.   
Interestingly, the Food Stamp Program raises above 50 percent of the poverty line   8
16 percent of the people who would otherwise have incomes below that mark.  It also 
raises 24 percent of children past 50 percent of the poverty line.  The corresponding 
figures for the EITC are 9 percent for all people and 13 percent for children.  However, 
food stamps only raises 5 percent of all people and 6 percent of children above the 
poverty line itself. 
All of the reported effects of the EITC, TANF and Food Stamps understate their 
true effects given the pronounced under-reporting of all of these programs in the CPS 
(Meyer, Mok and Sullivan 2009).  A rough adjustment to the numbers reported in the 
tables would scale up the number of people raised above various multiples of the poverty 
line by the ratio of true dollars received to dollars reported.  One set of assumptions that 
would make such an adjustment exactly correct is that non-reporting recipients have the 
same characteristics as reporting recipients, and that all of the dollar under-reporting is 
due to a failure to report any receipt.  Such an adjustment would increase all of the effects 
on the numbers above various ratios to the poverty line by 1.21 for the EITC, 2.05 for 
TANF, and 1.86 for the Food Stamp Program.
4  Such an adjustment would mean that the 
EITC lifts 4.8 million people above the poverty line, and would sharply raise both the 
absolute impact of TANF and FSP, and their impact relative to that of the EITC.     
The minimum wage is a policy alternative to the EITC that has often been 
promoted as helping low wage workers.  The minimum wage is much less well targeted 
than these transfer programs, with a large share going to children and secondary workers 
in well-off families (Burkhauser et al. 1996; Neumark and Wascher 2001; Hoffman and 
Seidman 2003; MaCurdy and McIntyre 2004). 
                                                 
4 These adjustment factors rely on 2006 under-reporting data for the EITC and the FSP, and 2004 data for 
TANF.   9
In interpreting changes in poverty due to the EITC and transfer programs, one 
must keep in mind that changes in taxes and transfers may alter pre-tax and transfer 
incomes.  A full analysis of the behavioral effects of these programs is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  However, one would expect that the mechanical effects of the EITC on 
poverty indicated here understate the effects of the tax changes on incomes, given the 
evidence in the literature (summarized below) of mostly positive labor supply effects.  On 
the other hand, transfer programs such as TANF and food stamps likely reduce pre-
transfer earnings, suggesting that any direct poverty reducing effects of these programs 
overstate the effects once incorporating behavioral responses.  Thus, this consideration 
would lead the figures in Tables 4 and 5 to understate the true effects of the EITC, but 
overstate the effects of the other programs.   
Researchers have examined whether the increase in income for recipients and the 
form of the payment has effects on several outcomes.  In contrast to social programs that 
pay benefits evenly over the year, the vast majority of EITC recipients receive their 
benefits in a single check averaging over $1,500.  Barrow and McGranahan (2001) ask 
whether the lumpy nature of EITC payments induces changes in expenditure patterns 
among recipients.  Barrow and McGranahan find that consumption rises, particularly for 
durable goods, in the months in which EITC refunds are received.  Thus, the evidence 
suggests that the EITC facilitates the purchase of big-ticket items by low-income 
families.  Smeeding, Phillips and O’Connor (2001) examine a large sample of individuals 
filing 1997 income tax returns in Chicago.  These recipients tend to report plans to use 
their credit for purposes that extend beyond current consumption, including saving, car 
purchases, tuition payments, residential moves and other uses that lead to economic and   10
social mobility.  Dahl and Lochner (2008) find that EITC payments appear to increase 
child test scores, but only in the short run.   
 
THE EITC AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
I summarize the effects of the EITC on work, with a particular emphasis on single 
mothers.
5  The EITC encourages work by making it more attractive to single parents.   If 
a single parent is thinking about whether or not to participate in the labor market at all 
over a year, the EITC unequivocally makes work more attractive.  Whatever hours level a 
person would choose if he or she worked, the gain at that hours level from working rather 
than not working has increased.  Given that for many single mothers the net return to 
working is so low (weighing what is gained by work compared to what is lost in welfare 
and other benefits), a few thousand dollars can dramatically change the calculation in 
favor of working.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) calculate that the average net return to 
working, defined as after tax earnings plus the cash value of benefits received if a woman 
worked minus the cash value of benefits received if she did not work (averaged over the 
earnings distribution of single women), was $7,270 in 1984.  Tax changes, primarily the 
EITC, raised that net return to work by an average of $1,442 by 1996 (in 1996 dollars).  
The increase in incentives was especially high for the lowest-skilled single mothers, those 
likely to receive welfare benefits and who, if they worked, were likely to be on the phase-
in or plateau portions of the EITC schedule.   
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) examine the effect of the EITC on the employment 
                                                 
5 Excellent summaries of the labor supply effects of the EITC can be found in Hotz and Scholz (2003) and 
Eissa and Hoynes (2006).     11
of single mothers using a very simple structural model.  They find that the employment of 
single mothers in 1996 was 7 percentage points higher because of the EITC.  Much of the 
identification of labor supply effects in this study comes from the contrast between 
employment changes for single mothers and single women without children.  For 
identification, the study also relies on differences across women by number of children, 
the state taxes they face, and the real value of the credit relative to state living costs.   
Other studies have found results that imply similar or larger estimates, exploiting mostly 
the same sources of variation.  For identification, Eissa and Liebman (1996) also rely on 
the single mother constrast with single childless women.  Hotz, Mullin and Scholz 
(2005), and Grogger (2003) rely on relative changes over time in the EITC credit for 
those with two children relative to those with one.  Dickert, Hauser and Scholz (1995) 
and others have used estimates for a single mother population to simulate the effects of 
the EITC.     
Table 6 reports employment rates of single mothers and single childless women 
with different levels of education between 1986 and 2007.  We see the largest change in 
employment for single mothers without a high school degree.  I report these numbers to 
show the variation driving the estimates of employment effects described above, though 
the analyses previously cited are much more sophisticated than the simple comparisons 
presented here.  The largest EITC expansions began in 1990 and would be expected to 
have completed their effects by 1997.  The last significant expansion was in 1996, but a 
slightly lagged effect might be expected if it takes recipients until after they or their 
friends receive a refund to learn about EITC changes (see Eissa and Liebman 1996; 
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001).  There are large increases in employment over this period   12
for single mothers relative to single women without children.  The relative changes fall 
sharply as education rises.  Welfare reform accelerated in the middle of the 1990s, so 
more sophisticated methods are needed to estimate credible effects in the later years.   
Since identification in several of the papers relies on the contrast in EITC 
schedules by family size, I also report employment by number of children.  The 
employment of those with two or more children changes little prior to 1994.  Starting 
then, the employment of those with two or more children rises relative to those with one 
child.  At this same time, the EITC schedule for those with two or more children was 
increased sharply relative to that for those with one child.  Again, this pattern suggests 
EITC effects on employment.   
These patterns in Table 6 suggest that the comparison groups used in past studies 
were reasonable.  Since 1999, the employment of single mothers has declined.  It is 
unclear what is behind this pattern.  However, an encouraging feature of this trend for 
past research is that the employment of those with and without children appears to have 
moved in a roughly parallel fashion.  Similarly, the employment of single mothers with 
two or more children has fallen at about the same rate as single mothers of one child.  
These patterns support the idea that single childless women are a sensible comparison 
group for single mothers and that single mothers with different numbers of children are 
comparable.   
To examine more rigorously the comparability of single women with and without 
children, and single mothers with different numbers of children, I estimate the following 
regression equation: 
   13
, ) _ _ _ * ( ) _ * (
) _ * ( ) _ * ( ) 1 (
it it t t it t t
it t t it t t it it
CHILDREN MORE OR THREE YEAR CHILDREN TWO YEAR







where Eit is an indicator for working during the year, i indexes individuals, and t indexes 
years (which run from 1986 to 2007).
6  The data are the 22 years of CPS information on 
single women ages 19-44 behind Table 6.  The set of control variables Xit includes 
education, age, marital status (divorced, widowed, never married), and race.  I leave out a 
constant so that I can estimate a full set of year interactions with the number of children.   
I plot the coefficient estimates for βt , δt , γt  and ηt in Figure 2.  The plot shows a 
striking pattern.  The four lines are roughly parallel through 1992, then they narrow 
considerably through 1999.  Afterwards they are roughly parallel again until 2007 when 
there appears to be some convergence at the end.  The period 1990 through 1997 was the 
period of greatest EITC expansion and welfare reform as was mentioned above.  While 
welfare reform was largely completed by 1997, one might expect that it would take a 
while for the effects to work their way through welfare caseloads.  If welfare reform 
discourages or prevents entry onto the welfare rolls, given the distribution of times on 
welfare, it will take a while for the full effect of the change in entry to affect the stock of 
welfare recipients.      
We also formally test for a constant difference between the various lines in Figure 
2 beginning in 1999.  This test corresponds to examining whether there is a constant 
employment rate difference between single mothers with a given number of children and 
single childless women.  I estimate the following specification, which is identical to (1) 
above except it includes indicators for all years rather than year indicators interacted with 
                                                 
6 The equation is very similar to those in Table III (p. 1087) of Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001).     14
an indicator for no children.   
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In this specification, a test of whether there is a constant difference between single 
mothers with a given number of children and single childless women has a simple form.  
One tests whether  δ δ = t
~
 for all t an element of {1999, 2007},  γ γ = t
~  for all t an element 
of {1999, 2007}, and  η η = t
~  for all t an element of {1999, 2007}  
The test statistic for equality over time of the three sets of coefficients over the 
1999 to 2007 period has p-value of 0.0194, meaning equality is rejected at the 5 percent 
level.  This rejection seems to be driven by the last year.  The p-value for the test of 
equality over the 1999 to 2006 period is 0.24, i.e. does not even weakly reject equality.  
In an important sense it is quite striking that there is not strong evidence against equality 
given that the sample I use has over 220,000 observations.  It is likely that small 
deviations from equality will be rejected.   
It is also useful to know how supportive the recent data are for the idea that single 
mothers with different numbers of children would have had similar changes in 
employment over time in the absence of the EITC.   The validity of this condition is a key 
requirement for the consistency of studies that estimate EITC effects by comparing single 
mothers with different numbers of children.  To test this hypothesis, I estimate the 
specification 
   15
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using the sample of single mothers.  In this specification, a test of whether there is a 
constant difference between single mothers with different numbers of children has a 
simple form.  One tests whether  γ γ = ′ t  for all t an element of {1999, 2007}, and  η η = ′ t  
for all t an element of {1999, 2007}.  The data provide little evidence to reject this 
hypothesis.  For the 1999-2007 time period, the p-value is 0.84, while for 1999-2006 it is 
0.94.   
Overall, the results are fairly supportive of the comparison group methods that 
have been used in the literature, especially in the case of comparisons of single mothers 
with different numbers of children.  There is also support for comparisons of single 
mothers to single childless women, but the deterioration of comparability in our last year 
of data indicates that we should bear in mind that comparison is likely not without some 
bias.     
 
THE EITC AND HOURS OF WORK 
 
The expected effects of the EITC on hours of work for single parents are 
complicated.  Most recipients are on the plateau or phase-out section of the credit 
schedule reported in Figure 1.
7  On the plateau section, there is a negative income effect 
and no substitution effect since marginal rates are unaffected.  On the phase-out portion, 
                                                 
7 1994 IRS data indicate that 26.6 percent of recipients with children are on the phase-in portion of the 
schedule, 13.9 are on the plateau, while 59.5 are on the phase-out portion (U.S. General Accounting Office, 
1996).   16
income and substitution effects are both negative.  Thus, most people should be 
encouraged to reduce their hours under the EITC.  However, this theoretical prediction 
has not been borne out in the data analyzed to date.  This lack of an “hours effect” is one 
of the more puzzling, yet robust findings in the literature (Eissa and Liebman 1996; 
Meyer and Rosenbaum 1999; Meyer 2002; Eissa and Hoynes 2006).   
Various explanations have been offered for this surprising finding.  The most 
common explanations are: 1) an inability of workers to freely vary their hours because of 
employer preferences for certain hours, 2) measurement error in hours reported, and 3) 
imperfect perception of marginal tax rates (Meyer 2002; Eissa and Hoynes 2006).  I think 
the most plausible explanation is imperfect perception of marginal rates.  It would not be 
surprising if recipients do not fully understand the tax schedule given the complexity of 
eligibility rules and instructions.
8  In recent years, the instructions for the EITC have been 
a very dense 13 or 14 pages. The marginal rates are not reported on the tax forms 
anywhere.  This situation is unlike the base income tax rates for which marginal rates are 
reported quite clearly on the tax rate schedules.  Most recipients do not fill out the tax 
forms themselves
9 and those who prepare tax returns for them do not routinely explain 
marginal rates to clients.  Thus, a lack of a response to the incentive to reduce hours may 
not be too surprising. 
The expected effects of the EITC on work and hours among couples are even 
more complicated.  Since it is very likely at least one parent is working, the effects have 
some similarities to the hours effects for single current recipients.  The income effect 
always discourages work, and it is likely recipients will be on the plateau or phase-out 
                                                 
8 See Romich and Weisner (2000) for a discussion of worker perceptions of EITC provisions.   
9 See General Accounting Office (1996).     17
regions where the substitution effect reinforces this tendency.  With couples, overall 
hours can be reduced by one of the partners leaving the work force, as well as a reduction 
in hours by one or more workers.  The main evidence on this occurrence comes from 
Eissa and Hoynes (2004) and Heim (2006).  While Eissa and Hoynes find that the main 
effect is a reduction in participation by wives, Heim finds mainly a change on the 
intensive (hours) margin.  Both papers find a small reduction in overall hours.   
A caveat on the labor supply effects of the EITC is in order.  It is likely that the 
increase in labor supply of EITC recipients has pushed down somewhat wages in low-
skilled labor markets in general.  This wage reduction decreases the earnings and 
employment of others.  While estimates of this effect are dependent on stronger 
identification assumptions than the labor supply estimates (Leigh forthcoming, Rothstein 
forthcoming), it is likely that the overall EITC labor supply effects are somewhat 
overstated by the estimated effect on recipients alone.   
 
THE EITC AND WELFARE CASELOADS 
 
The EITC reduces welfare receipt by making work more attractive than welfare 
for a substantial fraction of single mothers.  In response to the welfare reforms of the 
mid-1990s and the EITC expansions, welfare caseloads fell from over 5 million families 
in 1994 to just over 2 million by 2001.  Caseloads have been roughly steady since 2001.   
In his study of welfare receipt among female-headed families, Grogger (2003, 2004) 
identifies EITC effects in his regressions through differences in EITC maximum benefit 
amounts by the number of children.  He concludes that the EITC was responsible for   18
about 15 percent of the very large decline in welfare receipt in the 1990s.  He argues that 
most of the reduction in welfare cases seems to be through a reduction in welfare entry.   
 
PROBLEMS WITH THE EITC: HOURS, MARRIAGE, COMPLIANCE 
 
Three important problems with the EITC are its predicted negative effects on 
hours, its potential to discourage marriage among low income workers, and the potential 
for ineligibles to receive benefits.  The first issue, hours of work, has already been 
discussed above.  A concern is that even if we cannot see in the data a reduction in hours 
among single mother recipients, the theoretical prediction is sufficiently clear that we 
think it is likely to happen.  If the reason that we currently do not see an hours response is 
that recipients do not currently understand the marginal incentives, then if the 
understanding of recipients improved, the situation might change and an hours reduction 
may emerge.  Chetty and Saez (2009) field test a novel program using tax preparers to 
increase recipients’ knowledge of the marginal incentives to work under the EITC.  
Somewhat surprisingly, they find that providing additional information on EITC 
incentives has no effect on average earnings.  This surprising result may be due to the 
difficulty they find in getting tax preparers to successfully convey information about the 
phase-out range marginal tax rates.   
  A second concern is marriage incentives.  The EITC as currently designed has 
complicated incentives for marriage.  The schedule is almost the same for singles and 
couples, with the maximum benefit available to someone who earns slightly more than 
full-time work at the minimum wage (see Figure 1).  Because of this structure, the EITC   19
encourages marriage for some: those who have children, but with little or no earnings.  
The EITC discourages marriage for others: those with children who are working full-
time, but remain poor.  On net, there are more couples and potential couples who 
decrease their EITC payments by divorcing or staying unmarried than who would 
increase them by marrying or staying married.  Thus, the EITC discourages marriage 
somewhat overall.  Of the two most detailed studies that estimate the effects on marriage 
(Ellwood 2000; Eissa and Hoynes 2000), one finds no effect, the other little or no effect 
on marriage.  Ellwood conducts two analyses: 1) he examines changes in marriage rates 
of women at different wage quartiles, with the lowest quartile expected to be affected by 
the EITC and 2) he examines whether cohabitating couples marry, comparing those 
whose EITC amount would rise with marriage to those whose credit would fall with 
marriage.  Eissa and Hoynes identify marriage effects by comparing marriage rates for a 
sample of couples that are either married or cohabitating but differ in how tax and 
welfare provisions affect their marriage incentives because their earnings differ (and 
provisions change over time).    
The final major concern about the EITC, and the one that is most in the popular 
press, is the issue of noncompliance.  Noncompliance means not paying the taxes that are 
due, either intentionally or unintentionally.  The IRS estimates that in 1999, about 30 
percent of credit dollars were claimed in error.  The most common source of error is a 
claim where a child is not eligible, most often because the child does not reside with the 
claimant.  While it is not clear that this noncompliance rate is higher than for other tax 
provisions, a disproportionate share of tax enforcement effort has been devoted to making 
sure those who receive the EITC are in fact eligible.  EITC recipients have been subject   20
to a very large share of audits relative to the potential lost revenue.  In Fiscal Year 2004, 
the EITC accounted for 48 percent of individual income tax return audits, despite the 
EITC being only 3-4 percent of the tax gap (taxes due that were not collected).  Even this 
share is probably overstated given the IRS methodology, because even if the filer in 
question is not eligible for the EITC, another person in the household or outside often is.  
In addition, a large share of cases where payments are denied are overturned when 
assistance is provided to filers to help them understand the required documentation.  
Much of noncompliance is probably driven by needless complexity—14 pages of 
instructions in the overall tax guide, and 56 pages in the EITC instruction booklet.   
 
OPTIMALITY   
 
Standard models of optimal income taxation such as Mirrlees (1971) assume that 
people continuously vary their hours.  In such models, tax rates are always positive so 
that an EITC would not be optimal.  However, much of labor supply is the decision to 
work or not to work such as the participation of women, retirement decisions, and 
responses to disability.  Diamond (1980) shows that negative taxes may be optimal in a 
model where the only decision is to work or not to work.  Saez (2002) considers a 
situation where individuals have both participation and hours responses.   When people 
discontinuously vary their hours, i.e. the participation decision is important, then negative 
tax rates like those with an EITC may be optimal. 
  Liebman (2001) analyzes the incentive and income distribution effects of 
changing the many parameters of the EITC for single taxpayers.  He finds that a schedule   21
close to the current one is optimal for plausible relative weights put on efficiency and 
equity concerns.  These analyses by Saez and Liebman suggest that there is a significant 
theoretical justification for a policy like the current U.S. EITC.  I should mention, though, 
that studies of alternative policies that assume that policy makers can collect information 
on hours (and wages) suggest that such policies are better targeted and have fewer 
distortions than an EITC (see MaCurdy and McIntyre, 2004 for example). 
 
PREDICTED EFFECTS OF RECENT EITC REFORMS 
 
In an earlier paper (Meyer 2007) I discussed four types of EITC reforms: 1) 
providing a more generous EITC for 3-child families, 2) modifications to the tax schedule 
to reduce marriage penalties,    3) simplifying eligibility criteria for the credit, and 4) 
providing a more generous credit for single childless individuals or non-custodial fathers.  
1) and 2) were adopted as part of the ARRA of 2009.  I discuss the likely effects of these 
changes in detail.  3) I discuss briefly.  4) was proposed by President Obama when he 
was a Senator and was also discussed in the 2008 campaign but was not adopted.  I will 
also discuss this idea.   
The current federal EITC has a more generous schedule for families with at least 
two children than for families with one child.  Cash welfare (TANF), food assistance 
(Food Stamps) and housing assistance all rise with family size beyond a second child.   
Currently, the state of Wisconsin has a supplement to the federal EITC that increases 
with each child up to three.  Several authors (including Hoffman and Seidman 2003; 
Meyer 2007) have argued for a higher schedule for families with three or more children.     22
Larger families need greater resources to have the same standard of living, yet larger 
families tend to have fewer resources.  The ARRA of 2009 expanded the EITC for three-
child families. 
A second area for reform that politicians and academics have discussed is the 
reduction of marriage penalties.  There are several ways one can reduce marriage 
penalties.  One could change the married credit to be always twice the credit for single 
parents, but that would be very expensive.  Other alternatives that balance increased costs 
and penalty reductions have been considered by Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2001).  One can 
extend the plateau of the schedule or lower phase-out tax rates and thus extend the phase-
out range for couples.  Alternatively, one can add a second earner deduction, which 
would reduce the amount of income subject to income tax for families with two earners 
in the phase-out range of the credit, thus flattening and extending the phase-out.  This last 
option is inexpensive relative to the alternatives as nearly all of the lost revenue goes 
toward reducing marriage penalties, but it would require another worksheet to be added 
to the tax forms (Holtzblatt and Rebelein 2001).   The approach adopted in the ARRA 
was to extend the plateau of the EITC schedule for joint filers.   
 
EFFECTS OF THE ARRA ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
 
Table 7 reports percentiles of the income distribution for single mother headed 
families with different numbers of children.  Single mothers with three or more children 
tend to have lower incomes than those with only two children, but have higher incomes 
than those with one child.  At all reported percentiles, families with three or more   23
children have lower incomes than families with two children.  Typically those with three 
children have about 10 to 20 percent higher incomes than those with one child, hardly 
enough to compensate for the higher costs of at least two additional children.  This 
pattern suggests that targeting larger families could have a substantial effect on poverty.   
  To determine the effects of the ARRA three-child expansion, the first step is 
simulating the credit amounts that various people would receive.  I begin by reproducing 
the Census Bureau CPS imputation procedures as closely as possible.  Column 2 of Table 
8 provides my estimate of the income distribution accounting for the EITC under 2007 
law.  Comparing this column to column 2 of Table 4, indicates that I come fairly close, 
though I slightly overstate EITC payments at the poverty line and below relative to the 
Census Bureau.  Focusing on the poverty line, my imputation method suggests a slightly 
larger effect of the EITC on the number of families above the poverty line (11 percent 
rather than 10 percent).  I then use the calculations behind column 2 as my baseline and 
modify the program that produced this baseline distribution of EITC effects to reflect the 
EITC in the ARRA. 
  Column 5 of Table 8 simulates the number of people below the poverty line and 
its multiples under the ARRA EITC provisions.  We see that the ARRA EITC expansions 
reduce poverty by an additional one percent for either individuals or families.  This 
corresponds to over 427,000 fewer people below the poverty threshold.  Of these people, 
208,000 are children under 18.  I have also done separate tabulations for those in families 
with three or more children.  These tabulations indicated that the vast majority of those 
raised above the poverty threshold are in families with three or more qualifying children.  
Thus, it is the three child provisions, rather than the extension of the plateau for 1 and 2-  24
child families that has most of the effect on poverty.   
 
EFFECTS OF THE ARRA ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE MOTHERS 
 
  One of the most positive aspects of the EITC is that it encourages work.  Here I 
estimate the effect of the most recent expansion on the employment of single mothers.   
Using the simulation program, I estimate that the ARRA EITC expansion raised the tax 
credit received by a working single mother with three children by just under $515 on 
average.
10  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) estimated that $1000 in tax credits (in 1996 
dollars) would increase the employment of single mothers by 4.3 percentage points.  
Adjusting the $515 for inflation (a 2007 dollar was worth 76 cents back in 1996, adjusted 
using the CPI-U-RS), one obtains an average change of $391 in 1996 dollars.  Thus, the 
ARRA EITC expansion is predicted to increase the employment of single mothers with 
three or more children by 1.7 percentage points (on a base of 45 percent).  While not a 
huge increase, this represents over a 3.7 percent increase in employment for this group.   
  One might want to consider whether the coefficients estimated for single mothers 
in the 1980s and 1990s are applicable to the current expansion affecting three-child single 
mothers.  The earlier EITC expansions likely had such a substantial effect on single 
mothers’ employment because the net return to work (after accounting for lost welfare 
benefits) was so low for single mothers at the time.  Thus, I have investigated the present 
net return to work for single mothers with three or more children.  The return to work is 
                                                 
10 The simulated change in the average tax credit among single mothers with three or more children is 
$231.7.  This figure is then divided by the average employment rate in recent years (Table 6) of single 
mothers with three or more children (0.45) to obtain the average credit for a working single mother with 
three children ($514.9).     25
very low, as it was for all single mothers on average in the earlier period.  Single mothers 
with three children are very likely to be on food stamps and TANF.  They are roughly 
twice as likely to be on each program as a typical single mother.  The high implicit tax 
rates of these programs mean that the net return to work is often very low.  In this 
situation, it is plausible that an extra $515 on average for working could have a 




  There are many ways the EITC could be simplified.  While also true of other 
income tax provisions besides the EITC, the rules and instructions are extraordinarily 
complicated.  As already mentioned, the main instruction booklet includes 14 very dense 
pages on the EITC and the dedicated booklet on the EITC is 56 pages long.  Much of the 
complication with the EITC is the determination of who is a child for EITC purposes.  
Current tax law has several definitions of a child that apply to different tax credits.  A 
clear simplification proposed by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
(2005) would use the same definition of a child for the EITC, the Child Tax Credit, and 
the determination of dependents (per child deduction from income).  One could also 
consider combining these three tax reductions for those with children.  Such a proposal is 
a much greater change in the overall shape of the tax schedule and is a more expensive 
change but has been proposed by others (Ellwood and Liebman, 2001).   
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NONCUSTODIAL PARENT EITCs 
 
Finally, recent proposals have circulated to provide an expanded EITC for the 
childless.  Such an approach necessarily increases marriage penalties somewhat since it 
increases credits for the non-married.  Variants on this idea were recently implemented in 
New York State and the District of Columbia.  These jurisdictions now provide a 
supplement to the federal EITC for noncustodial parents who have paid all child support 
that accrued during the tax year.  President Obama proposed a national noncustodial 
parent (NCP) EITC when he was a U.S. Senator.  An excellent description of NCP EITCs 
can be found in Wheaton and Sorenson (2009).  The New York and D.C. NCP EITCs 
have very different age restrictions, with all those 18 and over eligible in New York, but 
only those 18-30 eligible in D.C.  The New York credit is currently two-thirds of the state 
EITC for a single taxpayer with one child, while the D.C. credit is forty percent of the 
federal credit for families with resident children (which depends on the number of 
children).   
These NCP EITCs are not likely to not have as big an effect on labor supply per 
dollar transferred as the current single mother focused EITC, given that most men work, 
even those likely to be targeted by a NCP EITC.  I analyzed the characteristics of 
noncustodial fathers using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP).  I use the 1996 and 2001 panels of the SIPP that provide information on child 
support.  Just over 4 percent of men 18-64 have a child living elsewhere with a guardian 
or parent and have no child under 18 in their own family (so would not be eligible for the   27
resident child EITC).   About two-thirds of these fathers are required to pay child support.  
Most of these fathers are already working, with only 4.7 percent of such parents not 
working in the past 12 months.  If we confine ourselves to those earning less than 
$21,000 (in 2003 dollars), i.e. with earnings such that they are likely to be NCP EITC 
recipients, 14.5 percent of these fathers did not work in the past 12 months.  Given these 
high rates of work, the inducement to enter the labor force that is so important in the 
EITC effects for single mothers is likely to be of much less importance.  It seems unlikely 
that a NCP EITC would have appreciable positive labor supply effects.  Given that 
marginal tax rates are likely to increase for most recipients who will be on the phase-out 
portion of the schedule, and that the additional income from the credit may make 
recipients feel less of a need to work as hard, the labor supply effects may even be 
negative.  An expanded EITC for the childless would, however, provide a way to transfer 




In summary, the evidence indicates that the income distribution features of the 
EITC are quite good.  The credit targets resources at those below the poverty line, 
particularly families with children.  It raises more than 4.0 million people above the 
poverty line.  While it is especially aimed at people around the poverty line, it also raises 
1.4 million people above half the poverty line.  The expansions to the EITC under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 were targeted at large families that 
are especially likely to be low income.  I estimate that the ARRA will raise over 400,000   28
additional individuals above the poverty line.     
The empirical evidence on labor supply and marriage indicates that the incentives 
of the EITC are remarkably favorable given the resources transferred.  Studies of the 
effects of the EITC on employment imply that the credit has sharply increased the 
fraction of single mothers that work.  These studies have mainly compared single mothers 
to single childless women or compared single mothers with different numbers of 
children.  The main assumption used to estimate this employment effect is that single 
women with different numbers of children react similarly to changes in the economy 
besides the EITC.  This assumption seems to have been borne out in recent data, though 
the most recent year of data breaks from this pattern in the case of single mothers 
compared to the childless.   
President Obama and others have proposed to expand the credit for non-custodial 
parents.  Two jurisdictions, New York and the District of Columbia, have such credits.  
While they will transfer income to those with few resources, non-custodial EITCs are 
unlikely to stimulate employment as successfully as the current EITC because the vast 
majority of non-custodial parents already work.      29
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Single women with children
Total benefits $15,253 48.30 $2,381
Number of families 6.406 36.13
Single men with children
Total benefits $2,643 8.37 $1,848
Number of families 1.430 8.07
Married couples with children
Total benefits $12,147 38.46 $2,284
Number of families 5.319 30.01
Table 1








Single women with children
Total benefits $15,253 48.30 $2,381
Number of families 6.406 36.13
Single men with children
Total benefits $2,643 8.37 $1,848
Number of families 1.430 8.07
Married couples with children
Total benefits $12,147 38.46 $2,284
Number of families 5.319 30.01
Individuals without qualifying child
Total benefits $1,452 4.60 $352
Number of families 4.124 23.26
Couples without qualifying child
Total benefits $87 0.28 $195
Number of families 0.449 2.53
Total
Total benefits $31,581 100.00 $1,781
Number of families 17.728 100.00
Table 1
EITC Benefits Received and Number of Families, by Family Type, 2007
Source: Author's calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2008. All
numbers are weighted.Recipient Characteristic Single Married Single Married
Average age (Years) 35.9 38.4 38.0 40.0
Educational Attainment (percentage)
High school dropout 17.0 31.8 16.6 8.6
High school graduate 39.5 36.3 28.8 25.3
Some college 35.0 22.4 30.7 27.8
College graduate 8.5 9.6 24.0 38.3
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of EITC Recipients, 2007
Recipients with Children Non Recipients with Children
Recipient Characteristic Single Married Single Married
Average age (Years) 35.9 38.4 38.0 40.0
Educational Attainment (percentage)
High school dropout 17.0 31.8 16.6 8.6
High school graduate 39.5 36.3 28.8 25.3
Some college 35.0 22.4 30.7 27.8
College graduate 8.5 9.6 24.0 38.3
Black (percentage) 22.6 8.6 20.7 6.0
Average number of children, by age
Under six years old 0.529 0.724 0.471 0.598
Six to seventeen years old 1.060 1.202 1.119 1.313
Total 1.589 1.926 1.589 1.911
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of EITC Recipients, 2007
Source: Author's calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2008. All
numbers are weighted.











Total benefits $28,149 72.82 $12,478 49.47 0.44
Number of recipients 12.46 56.55 6.250 39.11 0.50
Joint
Total benefits $9,567 24.75 $11,548 45.78 1.21
Number of recipients 5.18 23.51 6.010 37.61 1.16
Single
Total benefits $942 2.44 $1,200 4.76 1.27
Number of recipients 4.392 19.94 3.718 23.27 0.85
Total
Total benefits $38,658 100.00 $25,226 100.00 0.65
Number of recipients 22 02 100 00 15 978 100 00 07 3
Table 3
EITC Benefits and Number of Recipients, Comparison of IRS Data to CPS Data
IRS CPS
Recipient Characteristics













Total benefits $28,149 72.82 $12,478 49.47 0.44
Number of recipients 12.46 56.55 6.250 39.11 0.50
Joint
Total benefits $9,567 24.75 $11,548 45.78 1.21
Number of recipients 5.18 23.51 6.010 37.61 1.16
Single
Total benefits $942 2.44 $1,200 4.76 1.27
Number of recipients 4.392 19.94 3.718 23.27 0.85
Total
Total benefits $38,658 100.00 $25,226 100.00 0.65
Number of recipients 22.02 100.00 15.978 100.00 0.73
Total benefits $1,142 2.57 $1,437 4.75 1.26
Number of recipients 4.811 20.88 4.451 25.00 0.93
Total benefits $16,078 36.22 $9,888 32.67 0.62
Number of recipients 8.747 37.96 5.788 32.51 0.66
Total benefits $27,168 61.21 $18,940 62.58 0.70
Number of recipients 9.485 41.16 7.563 42.49 0.80
Total
Total benefits $44,388 100.00 $30,265 100.00 0.68
Number of recipients 23.043 100.00 17.802 100.00 0.77
Returns without a qualifying 
child
Returns with one qualifying 
child
Returns with more than one 
qualifying child
Source: Author's calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2004 and 2007,
IRS figures derived using data from SOI Bulletin Fall 2006 and Fall 2008 - Individual Tax Returns, 2004 and
2006, Figure H and the 2004 Green Book, Table 13-13.
Table 3
EITC Benefits and Number of Recipients, Comparison of IRS Data to CPS Data
IRS CPS
Recipient Characteristics
By Filing Status of Recipient 
(2003 data)
By number of qualifying 
children (2006 data)Without EITC With EITC
Difference (Without 
EITC- With EITC)
Ratio (With EITC/ 
Without EITC)
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (1)/(2)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 3,064.33 2,729.75 334.58 0.89
Below 75% of poverty line 5,137.65 4,348.76 788.90 0.85
Below the poverty line 7,620.91 6,520.89 1,100.03 0.86
Below 150% of poverty line 13,593.57 12,635.88 957.69 0.93
Below 200% of poverty line 19,632.09 19,293.73 338.37 0.98
Total Number of Families: 77,908.42
Individuals
Below 50% of poverty line 16,022.58 14,654.91 1,367.67 0.91
Below 75% of poverty line 25 841 63 22 761 41 3 080 22 08 8
Recipient Income Level
Table 4
Number of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the EITC, 2007
(in Thousands) - Census Bureau EITC Calculations
Without EITC With EITC
Difference (Without 
EITC- With EITC)
Ratio (With EITC/ 
Without EITC)
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (1)/(2)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 3,064.33 2,729.75 334.58 0.89
Below 75% of poverty line 5,137.65 4,348.76 788.90 0.85
Below the poverty line 7,620.91 6,520.89 1,100.03 0.86
Below 150% of poverty line 13,593.57 12,635.88 957.69 0.93
Below 200% of poverty line 19,632.09 19,293.73 338.37 0.98
Total Number of Families: 77,908.42
Individuals
Below 50% of poverty line 16,022.58 14,654.91 1,367.67 0.91
Below 75% of poverty line 25,841.63 22,761.41 3,080.22 0.88
Below the poverty line 38,076.73 34,113.96 3,962.77 0.90
Below 150% of poverty line 65,909.26 62,774.71 3,134.55 0.95
Below 200% of poverty line 91,760.55 90,659.51 1,101.04 0.99
Total Number of Individuals: 299,105.72
Children under 18
Below 50% of poverty line 6,169.87 5,359.69 810.18 0.87
Below 75% of poverty line 9,706.00 7,997.44 1,708.56 0.82
Below the poverty line 13,700.99 11,572.87 2,128.11 0.84
Below 150% of poverty line 22,029.86 20,594.96 1,434.90 0.93
Below 200% of poverty line 29,287.20 28,827.88 459.32 0.98
Total Number of Children: 74,402.74
Source: Figures are the author's calculations using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic
Supplement 2008.  All numbers are weighted.
Note: The poverty line refers to the standard measure reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Calculations
based on money income of families and individuals before taxes (excluding capital gains).
Recipient Income Level
Table 4
Number of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the EITC, 2007
(in Thousands) - Census Bureau EITC CalculationsRecipient Income Level




Ratio (Without FS/ 
With FS)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 0.89 0.95 0.81
Below 75% of poverty line 0.85 0.98 0.89
Below the poverty line 0.86 0.99 0.95
Below 150% of poverty line 0.93 1.00 0.99
Below 200% of poverty line 0.98 1.00 1.00
People
Below 50% of poverty line 0.91 0.96 0.84
Below 75% of poverty line 08 8 09 8 09 0
Table 5 Ratios of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the
EITC, TANF and Food Stamps, 2007
Recipient Income Level




Ratio (Without FS/ 
With FS)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 0.89 0.95 0.81
Below 75% of poverty line 0.85 0.98 0.89
Below the poverty line 0.86 0.99 0.95
Below 150% of poverty line 0.93 1.00 0.99
Below 200% of poverty line 0.98 1.00 1.00
People
Below 50% of poverty line 0.91 0.96 0.84
Below 75% of poverty line 0.88 0.98 0.90
Below the poverty line 0.90 0.99 0.95
Below 150% of poverty line 0.95 1.00 0.99
Below 200% of poverty line 0.99 1.00 1.00
Children under 18
Below 50% of poverty line 0.87 0.94 0.76
Below 75% of poverty line 0.82 0.98 0.87
Below the poverty line 0.84 0.99 0.94
Below 150% of poverty line 0.93 1.00 0.99
Below 200% of poverty line 0.98 1.00 1.00
Source: Figures are the author's calculations using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic
Supplement 2008.  All numbers are weighted.
Note: The poverty line refers to the standard measure reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Calculations
based on money income of families and individuals before taxes (excluding capital gains).
Table 5 Ratios of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Percentiles of single mothers' annual income, by number of children, 2007, Current Population 
Survey
Single Mothers with 
One Child
Single Mothers with 
Two Children
Single Mothers with 
Three or More Children
   5th Percentile
   10th Percentile
   20th Percentile
   30th Percentile











N 2,281 1,632 978
Table 7
Percentiles of single mothers' annual income, by number of children, 2007, Current Population 
Survey
Single Mothers with 
One Child
Single Mothers with 
Two Children
Single Mothers with 
Three or More Children
   90th Percentile
   5th Percentile
   50th Percentile
   60th Percentile
   70th Percentile
   80th Percentile
   10th Percentile
   20th Percentile
   30th Percentile









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lWithout EITC With EITC
Difference (Without 
EITC- With EITC)
Ratio (With EITC/ 
Without EITC)
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (2)/(1)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 3,064.33 2,707.27 357.06 0.88
Below 75% of poverty line 5,137.65 4,222.90 914.76 0.82
Below the poverty line 7,620.91 6,380.66 1,240.25 0.84
Below 150% of poverty line 13,593.57 12,536.15 1,057.43 0.92
Below 200% of poverty line 19,632.09 19,199.28 432.81 0.98
Total Number of Families: 77,908.42
Individuals
Below 50% of poverty line 16,022.58 14,476.62 1,545.96 0.90
Below 75% of poverty line 25 841 63 22 136 47 3 705 16 08 6
Table 9
Number of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the EITC, 2007
(in Thousands) - Author's EITC Coding (2009 law)
Recipient Income Level Without EITC With EITC
Difference (Without 
EITC- With EITC)
Ratio (With EITC/ 
Without EITC)
(1) (2) (1)-(2) (2)/(1)
Families
Below 50% of poverty line 3,064.33 2,707.27 357.06 0.88
Below 75% of poverty line 5,137.65 4,222.90 914.76 0.82
Below the poverty line 7,620.91 6,380.66 1,240.25 0.84
Below 150% of poverty line 13,593.57 12,536.15 1,057.43 0.92
Below 200% of poverty line 19,632.09 19,199.28 432.81 0.98
Total Number of Families: 77,908.42
Individuals
Below 50% of poverty line 16,022.58 14,476.62 1,545.96 0.90
Below 75% of poverty line 25,841.63 22,136.47 3,705.16 0.86
Below the poverty line 38,076.73 33,484.71 4,592.02 0.88
Below 150% of poverty line 65,909.26 62,478.22 3,431.05 0.95
Below 200% of poverty line 91,760.55 90,491.48 1,269.08 0.99
Total Number of Individuals: 299,105.72
Children under 18
Below 50% of poverty line 6,169.87 5,301.77 868.10 0.86
Below 75% of poverty line 9,706.00 7,774.12 1,931.88 0.80
Below the poverty line 13,700.99 11,316.17 2,384.82 0.83
Below 150% of poverty line 22,029.86 20,535.55 1,494.31 0.93
Below 200% of poverty line 29,287.20 28,865.06 422.15 0.99
Total Number of Children: 74,402.74
Table 9
Number of Families, Individuals, and Children in Poverty With and Without the EITC, 2007
(in Thousands) - Author's EITC Coding (2009 law)
Recipient Income Level
Source: Figures are the author's calculations using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic
Supplement 2008.  All numbers are weighted.
Note: The poverty line refers to the standard measure reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Calculations
based on money income of families and individuals before taxes (excluding capital gains).Credit
Amount
Figure 1:  Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule for Single Parent Families With 




Figure 1:  Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule for Single Parent Families With 









Figure 1:  Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule for Single Parent Families With 











Figure 1:  Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule for Single Parent Families With 


















Figure 1:  Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule for Single Parent Families With 
















Year and Number of Children Interactions - 1986-2007




































































































Year and Number of Children Interactions - 1986-2007
(Regression with Demographic Controls)
No Children 1 Child 2 Children 3 Children